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2021 is a year full of exciting anniversaries for Ukraine. On 24 August 2021, the
nation celebrated thirty years since proclaiming its independence on the remnants of
the fallen Soviet empire. On 28 June 2021, the country marked the 25th anniversary
of its Constitution. And on 16 October 2021, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine will
celebrate its 25th anniversary. Yet, while the previous two dates were indeed great
occasions for celebration and pride, the Court’s anniversary falls in the middle of a
constitutional crisis of unprecedented scale and with no clear prospects of solution.
The Court’s Crisis: A Brief Recapitulation
Alina Cherviatsova and Andrii Nekoliak have reported extensively on the Court’s
crisis on this blog before. As a short recap, the crisis began on 27 October 2020,
when the Court struck down a number of provisions in the Law 1700-VII on
the Prevention of Corruption and cancelled criminal responsibility for declaring
inaccurate information by those who have been required to do so under the said
law. According to the Court, the exercise of control over the judiciary by the National
Agency for the Prevention of Corruption was unconstitutional since the Agency is
an organ of the executive branch. As to the criminal liability, the Court found that
the punishment for filing inaccurate declarations was excessive. Met with fury by the
President and civil society, the decision was seen as a major and unexpected blow
to the nation’s efforts to combat corruption.
Since Alina Cherviatsova’s latest post, the crisis has not abated but even got
worse, sending constitutional adjudication in Ukraine further down into the abyss
of uncertainty. Just to give the readers a taste of the current situation: If you go
to Kyiv these days and ask people who is the current Head of the Constitutional
Court, you will get different responses even from persons with excellent legal
education and acute awareness of the current affairs. In this video with the telling
title ‘Chaos at the Constitutional Court,’ a journalist of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Serhii Andrushko, chases the judges of the Constitutional Court and asks
them a straightforward question: ‘Who is the Head of the Constitutional Court’?
Judge Viktor Kryvenko says ‘You’. Judge Vasyl Lemak refers the journalist to the
Court’s website. Judge Ihor Slidenko suggests going to the portrait gallery of the
Court where the pictures of the sitting judges are on display. The Deputy Head
Serhiy Holovaty also refuses to give a definitive answer, suggesting that it is up to
the journalists, not to him, to decide who is now the Head of the Court.
Counter-Intuitive and Unconstitutional
Why do the judges of the Constitutional Court refuse to answer such a simple
question?
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After having suspended the Head of the Court Oleksandr Tupytskyi at the end of
2020 due to a criminal investigation (as reported on this blog previously), President
Zelenskyy took further action against the Court. On 27 March 2021, he issued
Decree 124/2021. That decree cancelled two decrees issued by the notorious
President Yanukovych back in 2013 on the appointment of Oleksandr Tupytskyi and
Oleksandr Kasminin to the Constitutional Court. The lengthy preamble explains the
President’s motivation and, among other things, cites matters of national security.
As a consequence, Tupytskyi and Kasminin are no longer on the bench and their
seats are vacant. Zelenskyy’s decree is problematic for two main reasons. First and
foremost, Yanukovych’s decrees were not normative acts that were still in force; they
were applied only once and then extinguished. It is simply counter-intuitive, if not
illogical, to assume that a judge can be dismissed by cancelling the document on
his appointment. Second, Article 149-1 of the Constitution stipulates clearly how the
mandate of a Constitutional Court judge may be ended prematurely. Among other
narrowly identified cases on the exhaustive list, the Constitution allows dismissing
a judge by a two-thirds vote of the judges in case of a disciplinary violation. The
Constitution surely does not allow the President to dismiss the judges, either by
cancelling the decree on their appointment or in any other way.
Seeing the apparently unlawful nature of Zelenskyy’s decree, Tupytskyi went to
the place he knows best to navigate — the courtroom. Not surprisingly, on 14 July
2021, the Administrative Court of Cassation annulled the President’s decree. About
a month later, the President’s representatives appealed the decision to the Great
Chamber of the Supreme Court. While the appeal is pending, Zelenskyy’s decree
on sacking Tupytskyi remains technically in force. On this basis, the security guards
outside of the building of the Constitutional Court continue to block Tupytskyi from
physically entering the Court. In Tupytskyi’s absence, the Deputy Head Serhiy
Holovaty took over the daily management of the Court. Now, Tupytskyi and Holovaty
de facto both exercise the powers of the Court’s Head. They both issue orders
(routine documents that structure the daily business of the Court): Tupytskyi,
considering himself the Head of the Court, and Holovaty, considering himself the
acting Head. Moreover, Tupytskyi sometimes annuls some of the orders issued by
Holovaty. The Court’s secretariat appears to duly register the orders of both. The
ongoing situation of contested legitimacy may be properly described as dual power.
Four Judges, Two Seats
While the appeal concerning Tupytskyi’s sacking is still pending and the
Constitutional Court finds itself between Scylla and Charybdis, one can hardly see a
silver lining and the situation might get even more complicated. On 17 August 2021,
President Zelenskyy issued Decree 365/2021 and thereby launched a competition
process for filling the two vacancies on the Court that, in his view, exist since the
dismissal of Tupytskyi and Kasminin. Assuming that the President proceeds further
with filling the alleged vacancies and the appeal is lost, there will be four judges who
will claim the same two seats on the Court.
It is notable that the problem which launched the whole crisis has been solved in
December 2020 when the Verkhovna Rada, the parliament of Ukraine, adopted
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some legislative amendments necessitated by the decision of the Constitutional
Court. The anti-corruption machinery functions again, so the crisis in its current form
is thus more an outcome of a questionable understanding of the rule of law and the
(much needed) attempt to reform the Ukrainian judiciary. Also importantly, there
is barely any public support for the Constitutional Court. This is understandable.
The Ukrainian judiciary has been ridden by corruption for decades, so public
indifference to institutional attacks on the Constitutional Court is not coincidental
as the reputation of judges is distinctively negative among citizens. Furthermore,
in the twenty-five years of its existence, the Court failed to build public trust and
respect that would have allowed it to take unpopular decisions without fearing a
backlash. The media is full of investigations into the dealings of some of the sitting
Constitutional Court judges; some of them show disturbing evidence of corruption
and nepotism.
Lost Reputation
But not only the public, academics also have shown little interest in defending
the Court since the Court’s jurisprudence failed to gain their trust and respect. An
example at hand is its decision on the snap parliamentary election that took place
in 2019 after President Zelenskyy’s landslide victory (for a detailed analysis of the
situation immediately after, see here). The legality of calling a snap election was
challenged in front of the Court. In its decision, the Court wrote that ‘a constitutional
conflict arose between the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
… which has no legal solution.’ As an answer, the Court suggested the ‘resolution
of the constitutional conflict by the people by means of holding an early election to
the Verkhovna Rada.’ In other words, the Court simply refused to rule on the legality
of the parliament’s dissolution by the President. Needless to say that the decision
raised many eyebrows.
Notwithstanding how relatable and justifiable the actions of President Zelenskyy
might be, his actions only deepen the crisis. The only way out is appointing new
judges when the mandates of the current judges expire. The appointment has
to be the outcome of a competitive process that ensures transparency and the
faithfulness of the appointees. Also, it is of utter importance to lead effective and
impartial investigations into the public accusations against the sitting judges. Their
mandates will end prematurely if they are found guilty. Put shortly, a complicated
problem requires a complicated solution and a legitimate body can be created only in
a legitimate way.
One could hardly imagine a situation worse than this to meet the twenty-five-year
milestone in the history of the Constitutional Court. Meanwhile, the German Federal
Constitutional Court celebrates its seventieth anniversary this year, providing a
stark contrast to its Ukrainian counterpart; at least, it is clear who the President
of the Karlsruhe Court is. In June 2021, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine held
four academic conferences to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Constitution
and its protection by the Court. At least judging from the report published on the
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Court’s website, everyone seemed to have managed celebrating Ukraine’s fragile
constitutionalism while ignoring the elephant in the room.
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